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Abstract
Theoretical ideas about globalization and internationalization of higher education empha-
size the tension among different ideologies of higher education. According to literature, a 
competition among states, economy, knowledge, and status generates this tension to drive 
higher education development. This theoretical understanding not only shapes our global 
imaginations but also permeates the organizational behavior of universities. In this paper, 
we focus on the institutional logics that motivate universities in Kazakhstan to engage with 
China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). We investigate the ways that Kazakh-
stani higher education interprets and responds to China’s vision of a global order. Based 
on interviews conducted at 10 higher education institutions (HEIs) in Kazakhstan, we 
argue that Kazakhstan’s engagement with the BRI circumvents the cultural connectivity 
and global cooperation that are embraced by Chinese policy discourse and perpetuated by 
academic literature. Rather, institutional leaders in Kazakhstan operate with a utilitarian 
logic that seeks revenue generation, links with industry, and opportunities for students in 
employment and further education. The pursuit of these strategic outcomes demonstrates 
a bilateral engagement with China rather than the multilateral cooperation envisioned by 
policymakers. In a higher education system dominated by the state, the institutions in our 
study exhibit partial agency to accrue pragmatic benefits rather than concede to isomorphic 
pressures or mimic internationalization from neoliberal contexts. The discrepancy between 
policy discourse from China and policy reception in Kazakhstan raises questions about the 
rhetoric of a multipolar global order and the realities of international cooperation in higher 
education.
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In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the One Belt, One Road (一帶一路) 
initiative while on a state visit to Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan’s lead-
ing university that opened in 2010 with great fanfare, hosted this momentous event. Xi’s 
ambitious cooperation framework draws on the narratives of the historical Silk Road in 
linking China with over 70 countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa. Substantive areas of 
partnership include trade, investment, infrastructure, transportation, poverty reduction, and 
cultural exchange (Xi, 2013). In 2016, China re-branded this framework as the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) to minimize confusion over a singular route and deflect criticisms of 
hegemony. BRI actually contains six geographic routes of connectivity including a mari-
time pathway. Some observers also refer to this policy as the New Silk Road. BRI has 
become China’s most significant foreign policy platform in modern history with an annual 
expenditure of roughly $US150 billion (Economist, 2017). While critics and skeptics fret 
over Chinese hegemony and the Chinese approach to international development, BRI’s 
ambitious geographic coverage and policy scope are undeniable. This initiative continues 
to capture the imaginations of many policymakers within China and beyond. The BRI is 
essentially a policy chameleon that projects multiple hues in order to resonate with diverse 
policy sectors.
Under the aegis of the BRI, collaborations in higher education exemplify cultural con-
nectivity and “people-to-people bond” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015; Xi, 2017). 
While the original conception BRI does not explicitly mark out higher education as an area 
of cooperation, China’s Ministry of Education later released an action plan with multiple 
strategies (MOE, 2016). This extensive action plan emphasizes mutual benefits through 
academic exchange and partnerships. To “strengthen the dialogue between different civi-
lizations” such that “harmonious and inclusive development” can take place among BRI 
countries is the overarching message (MOE, 2016). In more candid terms, this action 
plan also stresses the “need to promote the reform and development of China’s educa-
tion” and promote China as a destination for international students. Since the announce-
ment of the BRI, higher education leaders inside and outside China have promoted an array 
of activities that leverage the narrative of the Silk Road. From student mobility programs 
to research conferences, many linkages with China have been subsumed under the BRI 
branding. For example, Xi’an Jiaotong University (XJTU) jointly organizes the Silk Road 
International Summer School each year with Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Over 700 
students from across BRI countries have participated in this program since its inception in 
2014. In 2015, XJTU initiated the University Alliance of the Silk Road with approximately 
100 institutions from 22 countries; this alliance also receives support from the Chinese 
Ministry of Education.
Kazakhstan provides a critical case study of the BRI given its historical association with 
the Silk Road and contemporary geopolitical status. For centuries, trade caravans from the 
Far East trekked across the Kazakh steppes to transport goods to Europe. Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, emerged as the largest country in Central Asia 
by landmass and the wealthiest given its oil and mineral resources. The BRI is another 
reminder that Kazakhstan sits at a critical juncture between Asia and Europe and acts as 
the “buckle in the belt” (Daly & Rojansky, 2018). China’s decision to announce the BRI 
in Kazakhstan in 2013 was cognizant of both historical gravity and geopolitical position-
ing. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has a sustained record in internationalizing higher education 
since its independence in 1991. For example, in 1993, the government set up the generous 
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Bolashak scholarship to fully fund study abroad (full-degree studies). To date, over 10,000 
students have benefited from this national scheme (Bolashak, 2016). Other internationali-
zation milestones include the joining of Bologna (2010), the development of successful 
private institutions staffed with many foreign academics (e.g., Suleyman Demirel Univer-
sity and KIMEP), and the creation of an international university (Nazarbayev University).
Despite the visibility of the BRI and the proliferation of events that convene partner 
countries, very few empirical studies on policy implementation and cooperation actually 
exist. Rather, reproducing the rhetoric of partnership, reaffirming mutual benefits, and cel-
ebrating the prospects of east–west interactions have become a routine in many circles of 
policymaking and academic discourse on the BRI. Empirical studies are crucial for under-
standing how stakeholders operationalize this policy. As Ball (1993) argues, “policy as 
text” is inadequate for gaining a comprehensive understanding of education reforms in all 
their intricacies. Noticeably, many of these BRI events focus on “policy as text” with a 
Sinocentric view while neglecting the voices of partner countries—the critical stakehold-
ers who will ultimately gauge the legitimacy of the BRI and shape its outcome.
This paper examines Kazakhstan’s engagements with the BRI through higher education. 
Specifically, the paper illuminates the perspectives of higher education leaders in Kazakh-
stan and clarifies their motivations for pursuing cross-border activities under the context 
of the BRI. Engagement is a more accurate term than cooperation or partnership because 
these latter terms imply parity and agency among actors, which cannot be assumed in 
international linkages. Therefore, the focus of this paper is less about China’s conception of 
BRI and dissemination of its policy discourse. While these issues are important, the exist-
ing literature often foregrounds China. Seven years after the unveiling of the BRI, empiri-
cal evidence from non-Chinese stakeholders and critical analyses of this ambitious policy 
remain scant. Therefore, the focus of this paper is on Kazakhstan as a key node in the 
BRI. How do higher education institutional leaders in Kazakhstan perceive China’s BRI? 
What are the institutional logics that motivate universities in Kazakhstan to engage with 
the BRI? To what extent do structure and agency constrain or support these engagements?
Theoretical framework
In an effort to understand the perspectives and actions of Kazakhstani higher education, 
three disparate but interrelated frameworks are useful as analytical heuristics. At the global 
level, theoretical ideas about global imagining of higher education can illuminate compet-
ing demands that present new opportunities and challenges for institutions. China’s ardent 
promotion of the BRI also reveals its global imagining as it disseminates its interpretation 
of global order across more than 70 nations. At the institutional level, conceptual ideas 
about internationalization provide more tangible frameworks for examining organiza-
tional strategies. Specifically, the literature on the rationales of internationalization shed 
light on why universities extend beyond their local domain. While identifying rationales 
is a worthwhile exercise, it is insufficient in providing a nuanced understanding of organ-
izational behavior in the broader context of society and culture. Rather, the research on 
institutional logic that emerged out of sociology and crossed over into management and 
ultimately higher education provides deeper insights into the interplay between structure 
and agency—a timeless phenomenon that has perplexed and inspired social theorists for 
many generations. While these three analytical frames are presented here as discrete lines 
of inquiry with distinct bodies of literature, we recognize that they are interrelated in the 
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realities of higher education development. Ironically, studies on the internationalization of 
higher education rarely deploy institutional logic as a theoretical framework even though 
the unit of analysis is often the institution by default. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
engage fully from all three analytical lenses. Instead, the paper will use institutional logic 
as the dominant lens given its theoretical depth, compatibility with our methodological 
focus on organizational behavior, and potential to elucidate actor agency. The following 
literature review covers all three perspectives but focuses more attention on institutional 
logic.
Competing missions in global higher education are poignantly theorized by Margin-
son (2011) in his analysis of the imaginaries that policymakers and institutional leaders 
espouse. Building on the cultural theories of globalization by Appadurai (1996), Marginson 
identified three pivots in higher education in a global context: status, economy, and knowl-
edge. The tireless pursuit of global visibility and performance vis-à-vis global rankings 
is emblematic of the status pivot. The dominance of the knowledge economy also steers 
institutions to present themselves as shepherds of both economic progress and human capi-
tal development. Finally, the pursuit of new knowledge remains a core pivot particularly 
among research intensive institutions. Marginson emphasized that these imaginaries are 
not mutually exclusive because hybrids are surely evident in higher education. Rather, each 
imaginary provides a different orientation for higher education. In a way, Marginson’s tri-
partite framework is reminiscent of Clark’s (1983) seminal work on the coordinating pow-
ers in higher education (state, market, and academic oligarchy) albeit situated in a global 
context.
Research on the rationales of internationalization often cites Knight’s (2004) early cate-
gorization: academic, socio-cultural, political, and economic. Academic rationales include 
pedagogy and interdisciplinarity. Socio-cultural rationales include language acquisition, 
intercultural competencies, and service learning. Internationalization also occurs through 
political channels such as development aid, peace education, and geopolitical alliance 
building, which often echoes the exertion of soft power. Economic rationales speak to the 
rising commercialization of higher education and the development of a competitive work-
force—this is the most dominant rationale today in many regions of the world (Chankse-
liani, 2018; Tsiligiris & Lawton, 2018). Knight (2008) updated these rationales to include 
branding; however, fewer studies have engaged with this new iteration perhaps due to the 
conceptual clarity of the original categorization.
A more recent treatment of the rationales of internationalization draws on the large-
scale survey conducted by the International Association of Universities (IAU) every 
4–5 years. Early versions of this survey used Knight’s four rationales (2004), but recent 
versions have identified nine rationales (Egron-Polak & Hudson, 2014). These rationales 
exhibit strong overlap with Knight’s framework. In a quantitative study of over 400 Euro-
pean higher education institutions (HEIs) based on IAU’s 2014 survey data, researchers 
found that the rationales for internationalization did not differ across countries (Seeber, 
M., Cattaneo, M., Huisman, J., & Paleari, S.  2016). Building on neoinstitutional theory 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the authors of this study argue that 
“an organizational rationale for action is oriented toward legitimacy as well as resources, 
status and reputation, and hence affected by institutional and competitive dynamics in the 
surrounding environment” (Seeber et al., 2016, p. 686).
A large body of literature exists on institutional theory in the context of higher educa-
tion. Fumasoli and Stensaker (2013) pointed to the pioneering work by Clark (1970; 1972) 
for sparking deep interests among researchers to examine universities as organizations. 
The debate over structure and agency led scholars to develop neo-institutional theory, 
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which spawned numerous studies on isomorphism as institutions compete for diminishing 
resources and greater legitimacy (Loomis & Rodriguez, 2009; Croucher & Woelert, 2016; 
Zapp & Ramirez, 2019). Institutional logics emerged out of neo-institutional theory when 
scholars began to doubt structural determinism and explore the role of context and agency 
(Townley, 1997; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Inspired by the work of sociologists Jackall 
(1988) and Friedland and Alford (1991), proponents of institutional logics argue that stud-
ies of individual and organizational behavior must recognize the societal context. Accord-
ing to Thornton and Ocasio (1999), institutional logics are.
…the socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material prac-
tices, assumptions, values, and beliefs by which individuals produce and reproduce 
their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their 
daily work (p. 804).
Rather than assume isomorphism as predicted by neoinstitutional theory, institutional 
logics expose the complex relationship between structure and agency (Thornton et  al., 
2012). An organization’s interests, identities, and values are embedded in its decision-mak-
ing (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Autonomy in terms of one’s 
ability to exercise choice is a key component of institutional logics even if this agency 
is partial. This perspective deviates from the large body of literature in higher education 
that illustrates global convergence (e.g., the world-class university model and New Public 
Management).
Shields and Watermeyer (2020) recently developed a valuable conceptual framework 
for evaluating institutional logic through a quantitative analysis of universities in the UK. 
Their work illustrates three compelling logics: autonomous, utilitarian, and managerial. 
The autonomous logic propels universities to uphold the traditions of intellectual inquiry 
and social critique. The utilitarian logic drives universities to work closely with the econ-
omy to spur innovation, employment, and growth. The managerial logic places HEIs in 
a competitive environment that justifies hierarchy and bureaucracy to survive. These dif-
ferent logics partially echo Marginson’s global imaginings: knowledge, economy, and sta-
tus. The autonomous and utilitarian logics also mirror the rationales of internationaliza-
tion: academic, socio-cultural, and economic, respectively. Managerial logic’s emphasis 
on hierarchical governance and competitive environment exhibits some connection to the 
political rationale of internationalization as some states exercise diplomacy through higher 
education.
This literature review shows how global imaginings of higher education, rationales of 
internationalization, and institutional logics overlap like a concatenated web. While global 
imaginings and rationales of internationalization are widely used to analyze higher educa-
tion policies and strategies, institutional theory is uncommon in the literature on interna-
tionalization even though many studies focus on institutional case studies. Therefore, we 
proceed to examine Kazakhstani HEIs’ responses to the BRI using institutional logics.
Methodology
To understand the perceptions of BRI and organizational behavior, this study uses a quali-
tative design underpinned by semi-structured interviews. We approached HEIs in Kazakh-
stan that self-identified as being active in internationalization with ongoing engagements 
with the BRI. We utilized both institutional Web sites and e-mail correspondences to verify 
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engagements prior to data collection. We approached some institutions that were active in 
internationalization but later found to be inactive in BRI or China; therefore, these were 
excluded from data collection as the study is not about generic perceptions of BRI or China. 
Thus, criterion sampling was used to select institutions and individuals who could speak 
from actual experiences of working with counterparts in BRI schemes to ensure participant 
credibility and authenticity. Our research participants were deputy vice rectors, vice prov-
osts, deans, and directors of international offices. These individuals led and oversaw inter-
nationalization mostly at the institutional level with a few at the faculty/school level. A few 
participants held leadership positions at a national think tank; their work entailed advising 
the Kazakhstani Government through policy recommendations and collaborating with Chi-
nese universities in research and planning. Altogether, we interviewed 17 individuals at 
10 institutions. These institutions include large, prominent national universities as well as 
small, vibrant institutions with discipline specializations and one national think tank. The 
institutions are located in the cities of Nur-Sultan (capital), Almaty (largest city), and Kara-
ganda (Table 1). Interviews were conducted in English, Russian, or a mixture of both lan-
guages. Each interview lasted approximately 1 h. Interviews were translated (if necessary), 
transcribed, and analyzed thematically to identify the main perceptions of BRI and the log-
ics of engaging with the BRI. Each institution has a pseudonym. A mixed university is both 
public and private in ownership (“joint stock company” in Kazakhstan’s documents).
Findings
Policy perceptions
The general perception of the BRI among our participants ranged from neutral to restrained 
optimism. Unlike the skepticism or alarm evident in the mass media about China’s ambi-
tious foreign policy, participants genuinely welcomed opportunities to work with Chinese 
universities, colleagues, students, and industries.
It’s a good opportunity to maintain and have all this cooperation through the coun-
tries of One Belt, One Road… This project will have a great impact on education 
partners between countries, between universities and between people. (Director of 
International Office, Mixed University).
Table 1  Institutions in this study Institution Location Participants
1 Private University A Almaty 1
2 Private University B Almaty 2
3 Private University C Almaty 2
4 Private University D Nur-Sultan 1
5 Public University X Almaty 1
6 Public University Y Karaganda 2
7 Mixed University Nur-Sultan 3
8 National University 01 Nur-Sultan 2
9 National University 02 Nur-Sultan 1
10 National Think Tank Nur-Sultan 2
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These views are also in contrast with recurring anti-Chinese sentiments in Kazakhstan 
as China’s presence grows larger in the country’s development.1
Several participants also noted that the BRI is vague and rhetorical:
We are all very good at talking. Talking is not a problem, but when it comes to mov-
ing beyond the metaphor and big picture to some practicalities, it’s lacking. This is 
why we need projects like a massive open online course on Central Asia or some 
joint degree programs… projects that have a beginning, a middle, and an end, and I 
think that is not fully resolved yet. (Vice Provost, National University 01).
Elites are usually more optimistic [about BRI]… saying there are lots of opportuni-
ties related to BRI and Chinese investment. (Director, National Think Tank).
[Our] level of the economic and political relations with China is very high, but it 
is not reflected in the development of international university campuses of China in 
Kazakhstan… We have several branch campuses but no good Kazakh-Chinese uni-
versity. (President, Private University D).
Several participants noted that there is a modest level of activities between Kazakhstani 
and Chinese higher education despite the visibility of the BRI and China’s geographic 
proximity. For example, one participant proudly declared that her university currently hosts 
nearly 200 international students, but only one student is from China (an ethnic Kazakh 
from Xinjiang).
Noticeably, virtually all participants reduced the BRI to links with China rather than 
embrace the initiative as a global framework as intended by Chinese policymakers. One 
participant astutely questioned this discrepancy in policy framing:
When we say Belt and Road and education, it has to be Chinese, Central Asian, and 
European universities. Otherwise it will be just Belt and Road for replacing China 
and Central Asia – very short. When you speak about One Belt, One Road, and 
higher education, do you mean regional programs covering all or some 44 countries? 
Or is it just a new way of saying China-Central Asia and China–Europe? (Manager 
of International Office, Mixed University).
This critical perspective on policy branding was rare among our participants. Interview 
questions on BRI often elicited answers that revealed attitudes on China and identified 
interactions with China.
Dominance of utilitarian institutional logics
To determine the institutional logics that drive engagements with the BRI, we asked par-
ticipants questions such as “What opportunities do you see in the BRI for your institution?” 
“What are your goals in collaborating with universities along the BRI route?” “What are 
some milestones your institution has achieved in the context of the BRI?” While Chinese 
1 For example, in 2016, protesters expressed outrage against land reforms due to anxieties that wealthy 
Chinese investors could occupy large swaths of land. The reforms were ultimately shelved. In 2019, protest-
ers lobbied against the relocation of a Chinese factory to Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan. In 2020, violence erupted 
in southern Kazakhstan between ethnic Kazakhs and the Dungans (Muslims of Chinese ancestry) over an 




policies and discourse on BRI underscore cultural connectivity through education, cul-
ture was seldom mentioned by our participants. A few participants identified cross-cul-
tural exchange as a key motivation, but the overwhelming majority of participants spoke 
at length about more practical matters with greater urgency and commitment. An initial 
review of the data indicated that economic interests dominated the logic of engagement, but 
further cycles of data analysis and recognition of context (both dialogic and societal) reveal 
that many motivations are in fact largely utilitarian and broader than economic. Among 
the 10 institutions in our study, utilitarian logic was the primary logic that underpinned 
involvement with the BRI at eight institutions. For two of these institutions, the utilitarian 
logic was on par with the autonomous logic, which endorses intellectual inquiry along the 
lines of knowledge and cultural exchange. The two institutions that did not express utilitar-
ian logic as the primary driver point to autonomous and managerial logic instead; both are 
small private universities.
The following quotes illustrate the dominant utilitarian logic among the eight 
institutions:
Our strategy in terms of internationalizing our partnerships… we don’t focus on a 
region because we look at the opportunity first. (Director of International Office, Pri-
vate University A).
People like us in Kazakhstan… we make choices about creating the best of all worlds. 
So, we operate obviously on standards for instance of academic integrity that we’ve 
inherited from the best intellectual traditions (British and American universities) and 
at the same time we’re interested in the technology, the scope and scale of ideas and 
ambitions that are coming from China. So, I think as a university we should be smart 
enough to find the best of all worlds. (Vice Provost, National University 01).
We want to understand how BRI connection can help Kazakhstan achieve its goals 
and whatever tasks are set in our plans and strategies. (Director, National Think 
Tank).
These comments reveal a Kazakhstan-centric utilitarian view rather than a China-cen-
tric perspective as one might expect for a discussion on a high-profile Chinese policy. The 
following section presents the three different motivations of engagement to illustrate our 
argument that Kazakhstani higher education leaders operate largely on utilitarian logic 
when engaging with the BRI.
Revenue generation
The tremendous potential of the BRI to trigger a boom in transnational education capti-
vated participants from private universities. In the parlance of higher education, the oppor-
tunities are evident in student recruitment, program expansion, and student mobility.
We see market opportunity [student recruitment] in China, India – Asian region 
rather than Europe, so this [BRI] is a priority. (Director of International Office, Pri-
vate University A).
There is market demand in Kazakhstan for Chinese [language]. Lots of students are 
interested. Out of 100 students, the majority select Chinese as their second language. 
There are also Chinese coming to study Russian. This is the indicator. (Vice Rector, 
Private University C).
There are 12,000 students from Kazakhstan studying in China. They study in differ-
ent universities. It’s not always good universities. Our task is to make access to good 
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Chinese education easier for talented Kazakhstani youth. The logic behind develop-
ing international campuses expresses the same idea, like [having] a Chinese branch 
campus [in Kazakhstan]. (President, Private University D).
While outbound student mobility has been common in Kazakhstan since the country 
gained independence in 1991, a neoliberal approach to internationalization is atypical in 
its higher education system. Cultivating inbound student mobility is only beginning as a 
phenomenon. Recruiting Chinese students to come to Kazakhstan and conceiving a Chi-
nese branch campus in Kazakhstan to satisfy local demands are both driven by a neoliberal 
interest in revenue generation. Interestingly, some of these strategies do not involve China 
at all but rather reveal a commercial view of BRI countries as an untapped marketplace for 
higher education. Unsurprisingly, private institutions that lack public funding were more 
enchanted with the commercial prospect of the BRI compared to public universities.
Employment and industrial links
Beyond direct profits for HEIs, several participants pointed to their interests in the BRI 
as a platform for employment among graduates and partnerships with Chinese industries. 
A chronic challenge in Kazakhstan is the mismatch between educational attainment and 
employment (OECD, 2017). In response to the BRI, participants rationalized engagement 
with China as a means to an end in the global job market. Learning Chinese and develop-
ing intercultural skills are viewed as pragmatic pursuits rather than something borne out 
of cultural interests or cosmopolitan ideals. This very utilitarian view of connectivity cuts 
across institutional types and embraces bi-directional mobility between China and Kazakh-
stan as the following comments illustrate:
A month ago, we had a delegation of businessmen from a Chinese petroleum com-
pany. They want to open a factory here to process gas and metal – that is why it is 
vitally necessary to us to learn foreign languages including Chinese. (Vice Rector of 
International Affairs, Public University Y).
Chinese businessmen who are working in Kazakhstan want to enter our graduate or 
MBA programs because they want to make business in Kazakhstan – that’s why they 
need to know legal regulation and how to make business in Kazakhstan. It is also 
important for our students to have business skills to work in China and to know legal 
regulations of doing business in China. (Director of International Office, Mixed Uni-
versity).
At this moment, most engagements of this sort involve teaching and training either in 
Kazakhstan or China rather than research partnerships.
Access to education
The clearest example of the utilitarian logic for engaging with the BRI is the access 
to education in China. Several participants noted the meager quality of education in 
Kazakhstan and viewed engagements with Chinese universities as a promising path-
way for Kazakhstan’s youth. One institutional leader at a national university marvelled 
at China’s success in developing its higher and vocational education and reasoned that 
Kazakhstan should learn from China’s experience. Another participant pointed out 
that several staff members from one international office at a local university received 
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scholarships from China and ultimately quit their positions to pursue advanced 
degrees. In interviews, China was often portrayed as a land of educational opportuni-
ties for talented and resourceful Kazakhstani youth:
There is also an opportunity for the students to study the language and then go 
abroad through scholarships… After graduation they easily get scholarships [in 
China] for master programs. (Manager of International Office, Mixed Univer-
sity).
We have students who are looking for any opportunities in China for summer 
schools, winter schools, any opportunities to get to China. (Director of Interna-
tional Office, Public University X).
Our task is to make access to good Chinese education easier for talented Kazakh-
stani youth. (President, Private University D).
We are working with two universities in Shanghai and Beijing. They are very 
powerful and impressed me even more than European universities. (Vice Rector 
for Strategic Development, Private University B).
Interestingly, the attraction to China was very strong even when prompted in inter-
views to address Kazakhstan’s long historical ties with Soviet and Russian higher 
education. Whether or not China is an appropriate education model for Kazakhstan 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but institutional leaders were unequivocally keen to 
link with Chinese HEIs for the prosperity of their students. This motivation is remi-
niscent of the thinking behind Kazakhstan’s long-running Bolashak scholarship pro-
gram, which the government generously funded to send students abroad while efforts 
to improve the domestic higher education system continued.
Limited presence of autonomous and managerial logics
Among the institutions in our study, very few identified rationales that reflected an 
autonomous or managerial logic. A few participants spoke about the value of inter-
cultural dialogue and learning from other societies for the sake of knowledge. Two 
institutions highlighted research partnerships with China—a perspective that is largely 
shaped by their status as a national university and a think tank tasked with research. 
One small private university noted that Asian institutions are now eligible under the 
Erasmus student mobility scheme:
Now Erasmus Plus does not limit to European universities only. It depends on the 
call for application… Erasmus is like USAID projects, which are a little bit about 
politics. European Commission is expanding its influence zone, their policies and 
power, and Erasmus is promoting its interests including in Ghana, India etc. They 
are even glad when you apply with partners from Southeast Asia. (Vice Rector 
for Strategic Development, Private University B).
Recognizing the value of Asian partners in funding applications illustrates a mana-
gerial logic whereby organizational behavior changes to fit new bureaucratic incen-





Kazakhstan’s engagement with the BRI must be understood in the context of its political 
economy and higher education system. The institutional logic perspective examines prac-
tice and agency “to appreciate the constitutive power of broader socio-cultural structures” 
(Ocasio et al., 2017, p. 17). Structure and agency appeared in different manifestations when 
participants were asked about actual practices of engagement with the BRI.
Several participants complained that Kazakhstan’s engagement with BRI and China 
lacked details from policymakers and institutional leaders. Given the seniority of some of 
our participants, this dissatisfaction was directed at the Ministry of Education and Science 
and the vice-chancellor / president of the university. For example, a participant bemoaned,
It [working with China] is a very recent issue. It happened at the top managers’ level, 
and we as an international office do not have specific information because it did not 
start implementing yet… It is too early to talk about results. (Director of Interna-
tional Office, Public University Y).
This view illustrates a pervasive sense of detachment among administrators in Kazakh-
stan’s higher education system. The belief that reforms must emanate from the Ministry 
and institutional leaders in a prescriptive decree is not unique to the case of the BRI but 
rather endemic to Kazakhstan’s higher education structure. Individual and organizational 
agency are constrained in a system that is historically rooted in centralized decision-mak-
ing coupled with punitive measures for policy failures (e.g., reprimands, job re-assign-
ments, and demotions). Kazakhstan’s higher education system reflects the Soviet legacy 
of command and control (Huisman, J., Smolentseva, A., & Froumin, I. 2018) even though 
there are ongoing efforts to introduce institutional autonomy. Interestingly, participants at 
one national university made the keen observation that the BRI integrates very well with 
Kazakhstan’s latest master plan for national development: 100 Concrete Steps, which for-
mer President Nursultan Nazarbayev promulgated in May 2015:
The 100 Concrete Steps is Kazakhstan’s big policy document [now]. It clearly talks 
about the same themes: increasing connectivity, modernizing the economy, skilled 
labour… Things that in one way or another clearly tie to Belt and Road. So, actually 
every document coming out of here [this University] also references the 100 Con-
crete Steps. Every funding application to the Ministry will by necessity include the 
BRI. Those are the big policy drivers of research right now. (Dean, National Univer-
sity 01).
This view of policy synergy is also noticeable at the national think tank, which holds 
Kazakhstan’s interests at heart:
Our Chinese partner [a government agency] proposed to do a joint project with us on 
how Kazakhstani strategic goals and priorities match BRI priorities and goals… First 
of all, it is interesting for them because they want to understand Kazakhstani agenda 
not only promoting BRI but also understand what is of interest to our government, 
so they have better sets of proposals etc. We want to understand how BRI connection 
can help Kazakhstan achieve its goals and whatever tasks are set in our plans and 
strategies. (Director, National Think Tank).
Integrating two large policy agendas reflects partial organizational agency in the face of 
structural constraints. While private universities and small institutions may enjoy a level 
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of reprieve from the state, national institutions such as universities and think tanks are 
beholden to the state’s vision of national development and priorities. The comment about 
inserting obligatory references to the 100 Concrete Steps and the BRI in grant applications 
reflects a managerial logic whereby bureaucracy and competition inform decision-making 
to benefit the institution (i.e., winning research grants).
While Kazakhstan’s higher education system is largely centralized and regulated by the 
state, actors are not devoid of agency. The 10 institutions we visited had ongoing activi-
ties with Chinese universities despite the lack of directives from the state or senior leader-
ship within the institution. These activities included student exchange, reciprocal site vis-
its, summer programs, personnel training, and modest research collaborations. Traveling 
to China to study and learn from colleagues exhibits agency with a utilitarian logic. One 
participant explained how a key partnership with China was formed:
There wasn’t exactly a selection process [of partners]. It was mostly networking and 
connections because we already have good relations with Renmin University. With 
Beijing Normal University, we had a connection through their professor who partici-
pated in our events… We also met the Ministry of Finance through our president’s 
connections. (Director, National Think Tank).
Another participant explained that her institution was keen to deepen ties with a uni-
versity in Hong Kong because her institution wished to replicate a successful hospitality 
program delivered by the Hong Kong partner. At another university, a participant attributed 
the benefits of the BRI to individual agency among Kazakhstani students rather than a con-
certed effort from China:
They [Chinese] don’t come to our university and say, “Here are the scholarships!” 
There is Chinese government scholarship within Belt and Road. Students apply to 
Chinese Embassy or directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (Deputy 
Director of International Office, National University 02).
While significant resources have been devoted to reform Kazakhstan’s higher education 
in the last ten years, policymakers and students continue to view international mobility as 
a strategy to overcome local structural barriers (e.g., affordability, low quality education, 
lack of specialty expertise, lack of scientific equipment, etc.). Quality remains a systemic 
challenge in Kazakhstan’s higher education system (OECD, 2017).
Discussion
Our findings illustrate that HEIs in Kazakhstan interpret and engage with the BRI based 
largely on a utilitarian logic. Instead of acting as a platform for cultural connectivity and 
global cooperation as Chinese policymakers intended (Wang, 2015; Callahan, 2016), the 
BRI is perceived by our participants as primarily a vehicle for Kazakhstan to achieve prag-
matic outcomes: revenue generation, employment and industry links, and access to educa-
tion. Interests in China as a society and culture took on a secondary or imperceptible role 
when participants elaborated on their institutional interests. Rather, pressing local chal-
lenges in higher education spurred participants to mine BRI for alternative solutions that 
can overcome structural barriers to organizational development and individual growth.
Our findings also echo recent studies in higher education that demonstrate multiple 
and competing logics among and within universities (Cho & Taylor, 2019; Shields & 
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Watermeyer, 2020). However, the utilitarian logic is not always about economic benefits 
in a higher education system that is governed by a strong state. For example, a Kazakh 
university that collaborates with a Hong Kong university for the purpose of replicating a 
successful hospitality program exhibits the utilitarian logic with an infusion of manage-
rial rationality that is difficult to ignore. For many years, the Kazakhstani Government has 
identified tourism as a promising industry worthy of development (PMO, 2019). An excel-
lent hospitality program could generate revenue, distinguish the institution in a competitive 
landscape, and appeal to the state’s vision of national development. Likewise, procuring 
employment and study abroad opportunities for Kazakhstani students is utilitarian, but it 
also reflects a strong desire for individual fulfilment and social mobility under a hegemonic 
state apparatus. Therefore, institutional logics may be difficult to disentangle from each 
other and from individual aspirations when the state plays an outsized role rather than a 
diminished role that is characteristic of a neoliberal regime. In many higher education sys-
tems worldwide, the state retains significant authority such that hierarchy and bureaucracy 
are well-accepted norms. Consequently, managerial logic in such contexts is less about 
organizational decision-making as a variable and more about an imperative that dictates 
behavior. Rather than focus on the indicators of managerial logic in such contexts, a more 
rewarding inquiry for future research would be to explore how institutions circumvent this 
managerial norm to survive and excel.
Among the HEIs in Kazakhstan, our participants represent the handful of institutions 
that actually engage with BRI. Therefore, contrary to the large body of literature in higher 
education on neoinstitutional theory that affirms isomorphism in a competitive environ-
ment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), our institutions strike a different path from most 
Kazakhstani institutions in their decisions to engage with BRI and China. Furthermore, 
these engagements do not stem from the pursuit of legitimacy over efficiency and rational-
ity as neoinstitutionalists claim as the driving force behind organizational behavior (Bitek-
tine, 2011; Mampaey & Huisman, 2016; Zapp & Ramirez, 2019). Our participants identi-
fied efficient and rational goals with limited reference to external judgment or recognition. 
They exhibited resourcefulness and initiative in seeking opportunities in China or with 
China for their institutions, staff, and students. The institutions in this study also present 
a different narrative of internationalization from many in the West, where revenue genera-
tion is a dominant rationale to buffer declining public funds for higher education. While the 
private universities in our study were keen to recruit Chinese students for revenue gains, 
this interest is still nascent in Kazakhstan’s higher education. Utilitarian logic among our 
participants also includes exploiting the BRI for employment and education opportunities 
for students; these strategic pursuits are less about neoliberal imperatives than a collective 
responsibility to ensure prosperity for Kazakhstan’s next generation. Therefore, we do not 
witness a convergence or mimicry in patterns of internationalization when comparing the 
institutions in our study with others in Kazakhstan or in the West.
Agency operates at both the institutional and individual level in Kazakhstan’s engage-
ment with the BRI. Enterprising students are learning Chinese and seeking advanced 
degrees in China funded by Chinese scholarships. HEI leaders are pursuing partnerships 
with Chinese counterparts via personal introductions and professional networking. How-
ever, as Friedland and Alford (1991) theorized, structure and agency are not dichotomous 
concepts that operate in isolation. Rather, organizations operate on multiple institutional 
logics bounded by their social context while continually seeking direct benefits (Cho & 
Taylor, 2019). Kazakhstan’s ongoing efforts to rapidly transform its economy and improve 
its higher education system loom large in the minds of our participants when they articu-
late engagements with the BRI. In a system with strong ties to Russia, our participants 
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actively seek opportunities with China. Some participants reminded us that Kazakhstan’s 
participation in Bologna and engagement with the BRI are in fact complementary rather 
than contradictory as a zero-sum perspective on power dynamics would surmise. Leverag-
ing a transnational policy such as the BRI to alleviate local shortcomings affirms Margin-
son and Rhoades’ (2002) theorization that actors continue to exercise agency in spite of 
globalization’s omnipresence and structural determinism.
Interestingly, our findings show that Kazakhstani institutional leaders view the BRI as 
a policy to connect with China rather than with a collective of actors defined by geogra-
phy, shared history, and solidarity as Chinese discourse emphasizes. Unfortunately, China’s 
global imagining with ambitious goals of global cooperation does not resonate among the 
institutions we visited. Even neighboring Central Asian states rarely appeared in our par-
ticipants’ comments about the BRI. While the Chinese Ministry of Education (2016) does 
identify concrete partnership strategies that direct attention to China, the BRI is not con-
ceived as a bilateral foreign policy. Therefore, Kazakhstani institutional leaders’ reductive 
view of bilateral exchange raises fundamental questions about the rhetoric of connectivity 
and the spatial scope of a new Silk Road when institutional logic defies the global imagin-
ing that is disseminated by policymakers, observers, and academics.
Our findings present several policy implications for both Kazakhstan and China as 
stakeholders in the BRI. For Kazakhstan, an overtly utilitarian logic may result in only 
short-term gains when Chinese counterparts recognize limited interests in cultural connec-
tivity and global cooperation. With many stakeholders in the BRI, China may gravitate 
towards partners with a genuine interest in deeper exchanges to accrue mutual benefits. 
Kazakhstani higher education could support students’ interests in Chinese language by 
building on the work of Confucius Institutes as cultural institutions.2 Kazakhstan’s par-
ticipation in the Silk Road International Summer School as coordinated by Xi’an Jiaotong 
University could be expanded to faculty exchanges that ultimately lead to research collabo-
rations. For China, the overall economic orientation of the BRI leaves cultural institutions 
such as universities marginalized in global cooperation. China’s rich history as a civiliza-
tion and its remarkable progress in higher education and research over the last four dec-
ades can provide valuable alternatives to Western epistemology and templates of education 
(Hayhoe, 2001; Kirby & van der Wende, 2019; Peters, 2020).
Conclusion
In this article, we examined Kazakhstan’s engagements with China’s BRI through higher 
education. Our inquiry is one of the few empirical studies on BRI in the context of higher 
education. Moreover, we focus on the policy reception in a critical node of the historical 
Silk Road and a prominent state of contemporary Central Asia. Using institutional logics 
as a theoretical framework to understand the motivations and behaviors of nine universi-
ties and one think tank, we found that Kazakhstan’s approach illustrates a strong utilitarian 
logic. Specifically, pragmatic goals of generating revenue, forging employment and indus-
trial links, and accessing education opportunities for students spur institutional leaders to 
embrace the BRI. In a higher education system that is heavily centralized and regulated, 
the institutions in our study demonstrate agency when pursuing opportunities without the 
2 There are currently five Confucius Institutes in Kazakhstan.
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typical directives from the state and university president. Autonomous and managerial log-
ics that exemplify intellectual pursuits and bureaucracy, respectively, were not prevalent as 
drivers of BRI engagement among the institutions we visited.
Our broader interpretation of utilitarian logic extends beyond a neoliberal phenotype 
as characterized in the literature. This interpretation evokes Singapore’s well-documented 
strategic pragmatism in Edgar Schein’s (1996) influential volume on organizational studies 
in an Asian context. Pragmatic concerns of capacity-building during the development of 
the Singaporean nation-state and contemporary Kazakhstan demand strategic efforts that 
embody multiple logics. We concur with scholars who recently called for further research 
on competing logics to better understand the interactions and the conditions for multiple 
rationalities (Ocasio et al., 2017; Upton & Warshaw, 2017; Shields & Watermeyer, 2020). 
We contend that this endeavor demands contributions from comparative education scholars 
to clarify institutional logics under different formulations of political economy. Studies that 
explore changes in institutional logics over time are also lacking in higher education even 
though Thornton and Ocasio emphasized historical contingency three decades ago (1999).
Finally, Kazakhstan’s involvement with the BRI reveals a reduction of this grand policy 
to connections with China. The original Silk Road was never Sinocentric as Peter Franko-
pan’s (2015) rich volume reminds us. China’s own global imagining of cooperation and 
solidarity also do not present a unipolar or bipolar world order. Greater efforts toward mul-
tilateral collaborations among BRI countries are paramount for a truly global framework. 
China’s neighboring countries such as Kazakhstan and Russia will continue to evaluate the 
BRI by their own experiences, interests, and vulnerabilities rather than by Chinese rhetoric 
(Daly & Rojansky, 2018). The existence of such a diversity of interests presents the com-
plex reality of a multipolar world order that China is advocating through the BRI.
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